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Abstract: Leuridan (2010) argued that mechanisms cannot provide a genuine 
alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the sciences, and advocates 
Mitchell’s (1997) pragmatic account of laws. I first demonstrate that Leuridan gets the 
order of priority wrong between mechanisms, regularity, and laws, and then make 
some clarifying remarks about how laws and mechanisms relate to regularities. 
Mechanisms are not an explanatory alternative to regularities; they are an alternative 
to laws. The existence of stable regularities in nature is necessary for either model of 
explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain.  
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Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities 
 
1. Introduction 
In a recent article, Leuridan (2010) has argued that models of mechanisms cannot 
provide a genuine alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the 
sciences. He instead advocates Mitchell’s (1997, 2000) pragmatic account of laws. 
The crux of Leuridan’s argument concerns the relationship between mechanisms 
versus laws of nature on one hand, and patterns of regularity on the other. While 
Leuridan makes some interesting points, especially about the connection between 
Mitchell’s pragmatic account of laws and mechanisms, he ultimately gets the order of 
priority wrong between mechanisms, regularity, and laws. Mechanisms are not an 
alternative to regularities as a model of explanation; they are an alternative to laws of 
nature. The existence of stable regularities in nature is necessary for either model of 
explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain.  
 
 
2. The Relationship between Regularity and Laws versus Mechanisms 
Leuridan claims that models of mechanisms in science1 depend on regularities, 
and thus on (a pragmatic account of) laws of nature. He concludes that mechanisms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I follow Leuridan in focusing specifically on the ‘new mechanism approach’, found 
in Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Machamer (2004), Glennan (1996, 2002), 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), and Bogen (2005). While the views offered by these 
authors differ in interesting regards, there is sufficient commonality between them 
(see Tabery 2004) to allow for a comparison of the overall view with alternative 
accounts of explanation.  
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depend on, rather than replace, laws. There are two components to his argument: that 
mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities but not vice versa; and that 
mechanisms are epistemologically dependent on laws but not vice versa. I argue that 
both of these components are misguided: mechanisms and regularities are equally 
ontologically basic; and mechanisms may be epistemologically dependent on 
regularities, but that regularities should not be treated as synonymous with laws. I 
briefly clarify the relationship between regularities and either laws or mechanisms, 
and provide a mechanist response to Leuridan’s challenge of stable regularities 
without known underlying mechanisms.  
Leuridan advances four claims to establish that mechanisms depend on stable 
regularities but that regularities do not depend on mechanisms. The first two are 
ontologically oriented, the second two epistemologically oriented. His argument is: 
1) “… Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on stable regularities. There 
are no mechanisms without both macrolevel and microlevel stable 
regularities. 
2) “…[T]here may be stable regularities without any underlying mechanisms. 
3) “… [M]odels of mechanisms are epistemologically dependent on 
pragmatic laws. To adequately model a mechanism, one has to incorporate 
pragmatic laws… 
4) “Pragmatic laws are not themselves epistemologically dependent on 
mechanistic models. They need not always refer to a mechanism 
underlying the regularity at hand.” (Leuridan 2010, 318-19; numbered 
format added) 
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First, I want to clarify the way in which his claims 1 and 3 connect: that because 
there are no mechanisms without regularities, mechanisms are ontologically 
dependent on regularities, and epistemologically dependent on laws (Leuridan 2010, 
312). Leuridan rightfully points to Mitchell’s (1997) pragmatic account of laws as a 
more plausible account of laws than accounts that rely on strict universal laws. Laws, 
in Mitchell’s sense, are causal generalizations based on stable regularities in nature, 
and these generalizations allow us to accomplish the same tasks of prediction, 
explanation, and manipulation for which strict laws were intended. Pragmatic laws are 
thus closely related to regularities – they are descriptions of regular patterns in 
phenomenon, combined with information about the range of circumstances, and 
manipulations, under which such regularities will remain stable and outside of which 
they break down (Mitchell 2000). Laws rely on regularities in the sense that the 
regularities are part of the explanandum of laws. If there were no regular pattern, there 
simply would be no reason to posit a law, no single coherent phenomenon to which 
we could attribute the nomologicity that distinguishes laws from accidentally true 
generalizations.  
This leads us to the ontological arguments, claims 1 and 2, offered by Leuridan. 
He points out that mechanisms depend on regularities but not vice versa.2 The first 
direction is not controversial: regularity figures prominently in most definitions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 To be clear: his ontological claim concerns mechanisms as the activity-connected 
chains of entities that we find in the world, not models of mechanisms provided by 
scientific descriptions of mechanisms. 
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mechanisms, most notably in Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000).3 Phenomena 
that regularly recur under certain circumstances simply are that which mechanisms 
are proposed to explain. Mechanism models explain stable regularities because the 
entities and activities that they describe are regularly linked: the causal chains that 
comprise mechanisms are regularly triggered given start-up conditions, they regularly 
lead through the component causal links in the mechanisms, and regularly produce the 
termination conditions (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). It is thus misguided to 
point to the close relationship between mechanisms or mechanism models and 
regularities as somehow undermining the legitimacy of mechanisms, as Leuridan does 
in Section 3, “Are Mechanisms an Alternative to Regularities?” Mechanisms aren’t 
supposed to be an alternative to regularities, they are an alternative to laws as an 
explanation of regularities. Laws are not synonymous with regularities, either at the 
macro- or at the microlevel. Regularities are the explananda for which mechanisms 
are the explanantia.  
It could be argued on Leuridan’s behalf that mechanisms explain only higher-level 
regularities, since they rely on regularity in the operation of various components. A 
mechanism could not explain both a higher level regularity and the lower level 
regularities that partially constitute it. But this argument is undermined by the fact that 
mechanisms are often hierarchically organized (Craver 2007). A mechanism that 
accounts for a higher-level regularity may include, as part of its constituents, lower 
level regularities. But that lower level regularity would then be accounted for by 
another mechanism, nested within the first. To take a simplified example, an account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In fact, Bogen (2005) was the first to depart from use of regularity in the definition 
of a mechanism; he has convinced Machamer (2004) to follow. Regularity need not 
be conceived of as deterministic; it can be statistical, also (Barros 2008). 	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for genetic transmission might include a model of mechanisms for gamete production 
or DNA replication. There will be lower level regularities in such mechanisms posited 
to explain those phenomena, which will themselves be fruitfully explained with 
further mechanisms. The way in which DNA is replicated will include a lower level 
mechanism for how single DNA base pairs are replicated, a nested mechanism 
concerning complex molecular interactions of proteins. Thus, both mechanisms and 
laws have the capacity to explain regularities at the macrolevel as well as the 
microlevel. 
Leuridan concludes from claims 1 and 2 that mechanisms depend ontologically on 
regularities. What does it mean to say that mechanisms, which are things in the world, 
collections of entities and activities organized into coherent chains that recur under 
appropriate circumstances, depend ontologically on regularities? Mechanisms’ 
ontological character is what grounds their ability to explain regularities in nature 
when they figure in scientific explanations that involve models of mechanisms. That 
means mechanisms both incorporate and give rise to regularities. In some sense, this 
does imply that if no regularities existed, then no mechanisms would either; this 
seems to be what Leuridan means. But to label this situation one of ontological 
dependence of mechanisms on regularities is awkward at best. Ontologically 
speaking, mechanisms and the regularities they give rise to or incorporate in their 
constituents are on equal footing. Both are equally ontologically basic.  
Furthermore, Leuridan’s claim cuts both ways: if one holds that mechanisms are 
part of the ‘furniture of the world,’ then there are no regularities without mechanisms 
that underlie them (more on this shortly). Laws also ‘depend’ on stable regularities in 
much the same way that mechanisms do, if by this one simply means that there would 
be no laws without regularities. If there were no stable regularities in nature, we 
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would have need of neither mechanisms nor laws. Law-based and mechanism-based 
accounts both take regularities as integral to the scientific endeavors of prediction, 
explanation, and manipulation.  
In claim 4, Leuridan points to the existence of stable regularities for which we are 
unable to provide a mechanism, and concludes that there can thus be laws without 
mechanisms. A mechanist response to this actually highlights how mechanism models 
are in a position to provide better explanations of regularities than laws do. Leuridan 
is using ‘law’ to describe generalizations based on stable regularities; his examples 
include laws of heredity in classical genetics presented by Bateson, Mendel, and 
Galton (Leuridan 2010, 325-26). Let us grant that the regularities in inheritance 
patterns count as laws, and that they provide the means to predict and manipulate 
patterns of inheritance in future generations (this should not be taken to imply that the 
classical laws of heredity are still accepted as laws). There may not be anything 
specifically wrong with calling these laws, if the contrast class is something like 
accidental generalizations. In this sense, there can be laws without mechanisms. We 
do not need to have a mechanism already in hand in order to recognize the non-
accidental nature of such regularities. 
But this historically-oriented picture leaves out the fact that these regularities 
became the focus of scientific investigation into why they held and how such patterns 
of inheritance were transmitted. Mechanisms were sought and uncovered as 
explanations for regularities. That means that a stable regularity is the starting point 
for a line of scientific inquiry, not its conclusion. Stable regularities offer avenues of 
research into the mechanisms that sustain them. Unless we think science is already 
done and wrapped up, there should be a lot of regularities of which we are aware but 
for which we are unable to, as yet, provide a mechanism. If one follows Leuridan’s 
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lead in treating ‘law’ as the label we give to sufficiently robust regularities, 
mechanisms then necessarily surpass laws in explanatory capacity, since they start 
from such regularities and proceed to the underlying entities and activities that give 
rise to the observed patterns of regularity.  
 
 
3. A Full Account of Explanation Requires Mechanisms 
It is worthwhile to clarify the scope of claims that mechanisms can or cannot 
replace laws of nature as a model of explanation in the sciences. Leuridan rightly 
points out that there are fundamental problems with the traditional notion of a law. 
One such problem is that there are few, if any, candidates for laws if we conceive of 
them as universal, exceptionless, and necessary. In general, the new mechanism 
approach does not claim that laws of nature play no role in explanation. Rather, the 
claim is that while laws of nature potentially describe the kinds of explanations 
provided by some sciences, such as physics or chemistry, they do not adequately 
describe the characteristic kinds of explanations provided in biology, neuroscience, 
psychology, and such ‘high level’ sciences. As such, it is more accurate to say that 
new mechanists claim that laws cannot replace mechanisms: we need both. Laws 
alone are insufficient. 
Within sciences like biology and neuroscience, however, there is a fairly 
straightforward way in which law-based and mechanism accounts of explanation are 
in direct competition. When generalizations in these sciences are based on stable 
regularities, they provide us with the means to make predictions, to manipulate 
systems to bring about specific outcomes, and to explain why things occurred as they 
did. Law-based accounts and mechanism accounts of explanation both involve a 
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characterization of how laws and mechanisms respectively are capable of these tasks 
(Leuridan 2010, 325; Mitchell 1997, 2000; Craver 2007, chapter 4). Both accounts 
address the range of strength and stability for a given generalization, why it has that 
range rather than a wider or narrower one, and how we ascertain what that range is.  
Leuridan seems to think that the only way we can acknowledge these features of 
generalizations is by giving them “the honorific label ‘law’” (Leuridan 2010, 325), 
and that “Nothing is gained by merely claiming that these regularities are not lawful” 
(Leuridan 2010, 326). This may be true, but it is also a vacuous reason to reject 
mechanisms. Nothing may be lost by calling a generalization a law; nothing may be 
gained, either. And in some cases, something may in fact be lost, namely descriptive 
adequacy of actual scientific practice. Scientists certainly do, as Leuridan says, work 
to “discover (statistical) regularities that can be used for prediction, explanation, or 
interventions” (Leuridan 2010, 326). But this does not mean scientists are working to 
discover laws. Regularities are not identical with laws, and discovering regularities 
constitutes discovering laws only if one already subscribes to a laws-but-not-
mechanisms account of explanation. That is, in fact, the very question at issue; 
describing scientific investigation of regularities simply as investigation of laws is 
question-begging. Leuridan’s claim 3 is based on treating the regularities involved in 
mechanisms as synonymous with laws. If Leuridan is considering laws and 
mechanisms as competitors for an account of explanation, then he cannot presume 
that all regularities are laws. Further, examples abound in the mechanism literature of 
the abundant use of mechanisms by scientists, including use of the term ‘mechanism’. 
If we are interested in capturing actual scientific practice (Leuridan 2010, 326), 
mechanisms have the edge as the model of explanation. 
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4. Conclusion 
Leuridan identifies a lacuna in the current literature on mechanisms concerning 
the issue of regularity. Recently, Jim Bogen (2005) has claimed that mechanisms need 
not be required to act regularly in order to count as mechanisms. This challenge has 
important consequences for our characterization of mechanisms and causation. How 
regularly do the start-up and termination conditions need to be connected, in order for 
the intervening causal chain to count as a mechanism? How frequently does a 
phenomenon need to occur in order for it to count as a stable generalization requiring 
explanation via mechanisms? There are a number of extremely interesting questions 
to be explored on this topic.  
In the end, though, Leuridan puts the cart before the horse. Mechanisms don’t 
replace regularities; they explain them. Likewise, mechanisms don’t depend on laws; 
they supplement them. The relationship between mechanisms and regularities actually 
tells in the favor of mechanisms as an account of causal explanation in the sciences. 
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